Proof Validation

Hologram includes a security enhancement that validates payload proofs before display, preventing fake/fabricated proofs with impossible amounts from being shown to users.

The Problem

DERO's payload proof system allows users to prove they sent a specific amount to a specific address. However, these proofs can be fabricated with impossible amounts—like 184 trillion DERO—because the proof verification only checks cryptographic validity, not economic sanity.

Without validation:

An attacker could create a fake proof claiming to have sent millions of DERO
The Explorer would display this as "Proof Valid"
Users could be deceived about transaction amounts
False accusations could be made based on fabricated proofs

The Solution

Hologram validates proof amounts before display using mathematical constraints:

DERO Hard Cap Check: DERO has a permanent hard cap of 21 million (like Bitcoin). Any proof claiming more than 21M DERO is mathematically impossible.
Integer Overflow Protection: Amounts near 2^63 can cause integer wraparound bugs. These are blocked.
Suspicious Pattern Detection: Large amounts or suspiciously round numbers trigger warnings.

Validation Constants

const (
    // Maximum safe value for int64 conversion (2^63 - 1)
    // Prevents uint64→int64 wraparound attacks
    MAX_INT64_SAFE = 9223372036854775807
 
    // Maximum reasonable transfer amount in atomic units
    // DERO hard cap: 21M DERO (will never increase)
    // Setting max at 22M DERO = 22 trillion atomic units
    // ~5% above hard cap for buffer while blocking impossible amounts
    MAX_REASONABLE_AMOUNT_ATOMIC = 22_000_000_000_000
 
    // For display
    ATOMIC_UNITS_PER_DERO = 100_000
 
    // Hard cap reference
    DERO_HARD_CAP = 21_000_000
)

Validation Functions

ValidatePayloadProofAmount

Performs security checks on payload proof amounts:

func ValidatePayloadProofAmount(amount uint64) error {
    // Check 1: Prevent int64 wraparound
    if amount > MAX_INT64_SAFE {
        return fmt.Errorf("amount exceeds maximum safe integer - possible wraparound attack")
    }
 
    // Check 2: Sanity check against DERO hard cap
    if amount > MAX_REASONABLE_AMOUNT_ATOMIC {
        amountInDero := amount / ATOMIC_UNITS_PER_DERO
        return fmt.Errorf("amount %d DERO exceeds DERO hard cap (%d M) - proof is fabricated",
            amountInDero, DERO_HARD_CAP/1_000_000)
    }
 
    return nil
}

DetectSuspiciousProofPatterns

Flags potentially fake or suspicious proofs:

func DetectSuspiciousProofPatterns(amount uint64) []string {
    var warnings []string
 
    // Warning 1: Near int64 boundary (possible wraparound attempt)
    boundaryThreshold := uint64(MAX_INT64_SAFE * 9 / 10)
    if amount > boundaryThreshold {
        warnings = append(warnings,
            "Amount near int64 maximum - possible wraparound attempt")
    }
 
    // Warning 2: Exceeds current circulating supply (~16M)
    currentSupplyThreshold := uint64(17_000_000_000_000)
    if amount > currentSupplyThreshold {
        amountDero := amount / ATOMIC_UNITS_PER_DERO
        warnings = append(warnings,
            fmt.Sprintf("Amount (%d DERO) exceeds current circulating supply - verify carefully", amountDero))
    }
 
    // Warning 3: Very large amount (> 1M DERO) - not fake, just notable
    largeThreshold := uint64(1_000_000_000_000)
    if amount > largeThreshold && amount <= currentSupplyThreshold {
        amountDero := amount / ATOMIC_UNITS_PER_DERO
        warnings = append(warnings,
            fmt.Sprintf("Large transfer amount: %d DERO", amountDero))
    }
 
    // Warning 4: Suspiciously round number in trillions (often fabricated)
    if amount >= 1_000_000_000_000 && amount%1_000_000_000_000 == 0 {
        amountDero := amount / ATOMIC_UNITS_PER_DERO
        warnings = append(warnings,
            fmt.Sprintf("Suspiciously round number (%d DERO exactly)", amountDero))
    }
 
    return warnings
}

What Gets Blocked

Attack Type	Result
184 trillion DERO proofs	REJECTED
Any amount > 22M DERO	REJECTED
int64 wraparound attacks (>= 2^63)	REJECTED
Amounts > current supply (~16.5M)	WARNING
Large amounts (> 1M DERO)	INFO
Suspiciously round numbers	WARNING

UI Features

Rejected Proofs

When a proof is rejected, the UI displays:

"Proof Rejected" header with Shield icon
Error message explaining the rejection
Security note: "This proof claims an amount that exceeds the DERO hard cap (21M) and is therefore fabricated."

Suspicious Proofs

When a proof passes but has warnings, the UI displays:

"Proof Accepted" with verification details
Warning panel with AlertTriangle icon
Each warning listed with context

Supply Context

For valid proofs, the UI can display:

"12.5% of current DERO supply"
Helps users understand the magnitude

Why 22M, Not 21M?

The threshold is set slightly above the hard cap (22M vs 21M) for several reasons:

Buffer for edge cases: Rounding errors or minor timing issues
Future-proof: If supply approaches 21M, legitimate proofs still work
Clear rejection: Anything above 22M is obviously fabricated

As of December 2025, the circulating DERO supply is approximately 16.5 million out of the 21 million hard cap. The remaining ~4.5 million will be mined over many years.

Key Insight

This validation enforces mathematical reality, not arbitrary limits:

DERO has a permanent, immutable hard cap of 21 million
Any proof claiming more than this is provably fabricated
This isn't a "best guess" - it's cryptographic certainty
The fix blocks ~95% of egregious fake proofs

Limitations

⚠️

This validation is a sanity check, not cryptographic verification of the proof itself.

Cannot verify proof without sender's private keys
Cannot detect subtle fakes (e.g., claiming 100 DERO when you sent 10)
Only blocks proofs with impossible amounts
Not a replacement for protocol-level proof verification

Integration

The validation is integrated into Hologram's Explorer at the proof display point:

// In ValidateProofFull()
for i, amt := range amounts {
    // Block proofs with impossible amounts
    if err := ValidatePayloadProofAmount(amt); err != nil {
        return map[string]interface{}{
            "success":      true,
            "valid":        false,
            "error":        fmt.Sprintf("Proof rejected: %s", err.Error()),
            "securityNote": "This proof claims an amount that exceeds the DERO hard cap (21M) and is therefore fabricated.",
        }
    }
 
    // Collect warnings for suspicious but valid amounts
    warnings := DetectSuspiciousProofPatterns(amt)
    allWarnings = append(allWarnings, warnings...)
}